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OPA AND ECONOMIc Loss: A REPLY TO
PROFESSOR ROBERTSON
John C.P. Goldberg*
The Oil Pollution Act ("OPA") authorizes claims for pure economic
loss-claims for lost profits that do not result from personal injury to the
claimant or damage to property owned by the claimant. The question is:
Which claims? The statute specifies that "any claimant" may obtain com-
pensation for economic loss from a party responsible for an oil spill, but
only if the loss is "due to . .. injury, destruction, or loss of real property,
personal property, or natural resources" that "result[s] from" a discharge
of oil.' The report that I prepared ("the Report") for the Gulf Coast
Claims Facility ("GCCF") maintains that this language is best understood
to authorize recovery for any person who suffers economic loss because an
oil spill has interfered with his or her ability to use property or resources
that he or she has a particular right to put to commercial use.2 For exam-
ple, commercial fishermen who are prevented by a spill from fishing, and
thereby lose revenue or wages, stand to recover from a party responsible
for the spill-these are losses "due to ... injury, destruction, or loss of ...
natural resources" that "result from" a spill.3
The Report's analysis of OPA has now earned the scrutiny of Profes-
sor Robertson, one of our nation's leading admiralty law scholars. In his
view, the Report is deeply flawed-wrong generally and wrong in most of
its particulars. Readers can judge for themselves, but I stand by it. None
of the major objections raised by Professor Robertson are sound. In addi-
tion, although he claims to offer a more principled and more faithful 'read-
ing of OPA, it is neither.
I. PRELIMINARIES
Before turning to the merits, I will respond briefly to Professor Rob-
ertson's efforts to impeach the Report and its author. I also wish to ac-
knowledge a minor error in the Report. I am grateful to Professor
Robertson for pointing it out, though he vastly overstates its significance.
* Professor, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Erin Bachman and the Mississippi College Law
Review for inviting this response and, once again, to Deepa Alagesan, Morgan Goodspeed, Andrew
Kaufman, Kostya Lantsman, and Benjamin Mundel for very helpful research assistance. Any
remaining errors are mine.
1. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2011).
2. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, LIABILITY FOR Ec ONoMIC Loss IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEEPWA-
11 R 1HoG/oN SPii 7 (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/Goldberg.Memorandum.
of.Law.2010.pdf, reprinted in 30 Miss. C. L. REv. 335 app. (2011).
3. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702.
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A. The Report is Not A Litigation Document
The tone of Professor Robertson's critique demonstrates that he is, in
this instance, writing as much as a litigation consultant as an academic.4
Thus, he wastes no time attempting to impeach the Report on grounds of
bias. Specifically, he insinuates that I was hired by Kenneth Feinberg, Ad-
ministrator of the GCCF, to provide "assistance" to Mr. Feinberg's "quest"
[for] "legal principles that might justify the exclusion of [certain] economic
loss claimants."5
I was indeed retained by Mr. Feinberg. Additionally, the federal judge
overseeing the multi-district litigation that has arisen out of the spill has
ruled that Mr. Feinberg cannot claim to be "fully independent" of BP." 6 It
is nonetheless false to suggest that I was charged with the task of identify-
ing grounds for limiting payouts by the GCCF. I was asked to prepare a
memorandum interpreting the scope of liability for economic loss under
OPA, as well as federal admiralty law and state tort law. At no time did
Mr. Feinberg assert or imply that my job was to construe the law in a man-
ner that would assist him in finding ways to exclude claims. If the best
interpretation of OPA entailed a limitless domain of economic loss liability,
then that is the domain that the Report would have described.
A moment's reflection on the context in which the Report was pre-
pared and issued reveals that the occasion did not call for an advocacy doc-
ument. Mr. Feinberg wanted to know-as much as one can know prior to a
definitive judicial resolution-the prospects facing different categories of
economic loss claimants. He would hardly have benefited from receiving a
skewed report. Given the high stakes and the degree of scrutiny that the
Report was destined to receive, a result-oriented analysis would rapidly
have been exposed as such and would have undermined Mr. Feinberg's
efforts to convince claimants that the Fund presents a reasonable alterna-
tive to litigation. The Report's approach to the problem of economic loss
liability is academic, not adversarial. Its analysis and conclusions should be
engaged on the merits, not attacked indirectly through allegations of bias.7
4. David Robertson, The Oil Pollution Act's Provisions on Damages for Economic Loss, 30
Miss. C.L. Ri v. 157, 157 n.* (2011) (acknowledging that Professor Robertson has been retained as a
consultant to plaintiffs' lawyers suing BP). Although Professor Robertson suggests that I have tailored
my views of OPA to help the GCCF achieve its purported goals, I would like to make clear that I make
no such claim about Professor Robertson. I believe that his critique reflects his sincere views as to the
best interpretation of OPA, just as the Report reflects mine. Here I am merely noting the strident tone
of his critique, including its eagerness to engage in the sort of impeachment tactics that are characteris-
tic of aggressive litigation and less characteristic of academic discourse.
5. Robertson, supra note 4, at 163. This insinuation goes along with Professor Robertson's as-
sertion that the Report is the work of a "conjurer" who has deliberately employed trickery to bestow
plausibility on a blatant misreading of the law. See infra text accompanying notes 8-10.
6. Transfer Order at 8, In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of
Mexico, on April 20, 2010, MDL No. 2179 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011), available at http://www.laed.uscourts.
gov/OilSpill/Orders/220110rderonRecDoc9 12.pdf.
7. Lest the foregoing remarks be misconstrued, I should make clear that I am not claiming for
myself some special capacity for impartiality or objectivity, nor some sort of invincibility to error. (As
to the latter, see infra text accompanying note 11.) 1 mean only to stress that the Report, contrary to
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B. Of Conjuring
Professor Robertson ascribes to the Report a litany of interpretive er-
rors. Among other things, it is said to insert words into OPA that the stat-
ute does not contain, to misuse legislative history, to misstate OPA's
common law background, and to ignore the policy concerns that undergird
OPA. One might have thought that an effort at statutory interpretation
this fantastically inept would wear its falsity on its sleeve-these alleged
errors are hardly subtle-and yet Professor Robertson concludes with an
odd concession. The Report's analysis, he says, carries an "impressive
plausibility."8 So, now we have a puzzle. How can an exercise in statutory
interpretation that is so miserably wrongheaded manage to achieve plausi-
bility? The answer provided is that the Report employs the tricks of a
"conjurer" and a "magician."' It is only my alleged invocation of these
dark arts that permits an embarrassingly deficient bit of statutory interpre-
tation to appear credible.
Criticisms of this sort are insidious because they are structured to re-
sist refutation.'0 Perhaps the best I can do under these circumstances is to
invoke Ockham's Razor-the idea that, as between a convoluted and a
simple explanation, the simple one is usually better. In this instance, the
thing being explained is the Report's apparent plausibility. Here are two
possible explanations. The first is Professor Robertson's; the second is
mine.
(1) The Report's interpretation of OPA is utterly implausi-
ble but appears to be plausible because of the author's use
of magic tricks.
(2) The Report's interpretation of OPA appears to be plau-
sible because it is plausible.
Ockham's Razor, not to mention common sense, favors the adoption of the
second explanation.
C. Erratum
Professor Robertson identifies an error in footnote 42 of the Report."
The footnote correctly states that Section 2704(c)(1) of OPA uses the
phrase "proximately caused," and that this usage stands in contrast to Sec-
tion 2702(b)(2)(E), which, in specifying terms of liability for economic loss,
Professor Robertson's suggestion, cannot fairly be characterized as a litigator's brief on behalf of GCCF
or BP.
8. Robertson, supra note 4, at 202.
9. Jd. at 196. 199 n.207.
10. Were I to offer a seemingly plausible rebuttal to Professor Robertson's charges, the plausibil-
ity of that rebuttal could be dismissed as just another bit of conjuring.
11. Robertson, supra note 4, at 186-87.
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does not use that phrase.' 2 However, the footnote then erroneously asserts
that Section 2704(c)(1) invokes the language of proximate cause in defining
circumstances under which an otherwise responsible party can avoid liabil-
ity." Section 2704(c)(1) does not specify grounds for liability avoidance,
rather it identifies circumstances in which a responsible party, because of
its own fault in contributing to a spill, is denied the benefit of the liability
caps identified in Section 2704(a). Here, the Report mistakenly conflates
Section 2704(c)(1) with a different OPA provision, Section 2703(a). 1 4 Sec-
tion 2703(a) does define circumstances-for example, an act of God-that
permits a responsible party to avoid liability, but it does not use the phrase
"proximately caused." Instead, it employs yet another variant on causal
language. It says that there will be no liability for a spill "caused solely by"
an act of God" and certain other intervening events.' 5
Having confessed error, I reject entirely Professor Robertson's effort
to make a mountain out of a molehill. He says that the conflation of Sec-
tions 2704(c)(1) and 2703(a) "robs . . . the remainder of [the] footnote of
intelligibility."' 6 It doesn't. To see that this is so, one need only substitute
for the erroneous second sentence of footnote 42 the following accurate
sentence: "It is true that another OPA provision-Section 2704(c)(1)-em-
ploys the phrase "proximately caused" in specifying the circumstances in
which a responsible party loses the benefit of otherwise applicable liability
caps." Making this change takes away nothing from the ensuing and princi-
pal point, which is that OPA's explicit articulation of a two-layer causation
requirement for claims of pure economic loss defeats an inference that
might otherwise be drawn from the presence of "proximate cause" lan-
guage in Section 2704(c)(1) and its absence in the statute's economic loss
provisions. Were OPA worded differently-i.e., were it not expressly to
connect recovery for economic loss to injury to property or resources re-
sulting from a spill-a canon of construction drawn from the Supreme
Court's Russello decision might permit an inference about the breadth of
economic loss liability from the fact that Section 2702(b)(2)(E) lacks "prox-
imate cause" language, whereas another nearby provision-Section
2704(c)(1)-contains it. But, there is no occasion for such an inference
because Sections 2702(a) and 2702(b)(2)(E) together set an express limita-
tion on liability beyond proof of an actual causal connection between an oil
spill and economic loss.17
12. GOIimHzc, supra note 2, at 20 n.42; see 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (stating that a responsible
party cannot obtain the benefit of liability caps for a spill "proximately caused by," among other things,
that party's "gross negligence or willful misconduct").
13. GOi ii izcI, supra note 2, at 20 n.42.
14. Id. at 20 n.42; see 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (stating that no liability will attach to a spill that is
proven to have been "caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, [or] an act or omission of [certain]
third part[ies]").
15. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (emphasis added).
16. Rubertsuii, supra iiute 4, at 186.
17. Congress used multiple variants of causation language in several adjacent OPA provisions.
See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) ("result from"); 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(B) ("resulting from"); 33 U.S.C.
§ 2702(b)(2)(D), (E) ("due to"); 33 U.S.C. §2703(a) ("caused solely by"); 33 U.S.C. §2703(b) ("caused
206 [VOL. 30:203
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II. INTERPRETING OPA's EcoNoMic Loss PROVISIONS
A. OPA's Approach to Economic Loss Liability
As noted previously, OPA specifies that damages for economic loss
are recoverable if those losses are "due to ... . .. injury, destruction, or loss
of real property, personal property, or natural resources" that "result[s]
from" an oil spill.'8 Professor Robertson maintains that the Report's fun-
damental error resides in its insistence that the words "due to" must be
construed to mean "proximately caused by." This, he suggests, violates or-
dinary English usage." The ordinary meaning of the phrase "due to," he
says, is "[actually] caused by," not "proximately caused by." 20
It is not obvious that Professor Robertson can claim the advantage of
closer adherence to ordinary usage. As H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honor6
pointed out long ago, standard English phrases like "due to" and "caused
by" quite often commingle notions of actual causation with limiting princi-
ples of the sort that courts often invoke under the heading of "proximate
cause." 21 Imagine a newscast reporting that a plane crash was "due to"
pilot error. To focus on pilot error is to single out, in the context of an
inquiry into responsibility, a particularly salient precipitating event from an
infinite set of causal antecedents. Hence we would think it odd if the new-
scast asserted that the crash was "due to" the Wright Brothers' efforts to
develop powered flight, even though those efforts presumably also count as
an actual cause of the crash. In law and ordinary conversation, when the
concern is to attribute responsibility, the phrase "due to" tends to isolate
normatively significant necessary conditions, and in that respect carries
with it proximate-cause-like refinements.
Irrespective of the force of the foregoing observation, Professor Rob-
ertson's objection fails for a more basic reason. It is a red herring. The
by"); 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) ("proximately caused by"). For this reason alone, it is unrealistic to treat
the appearance of one or another of these different phrases as in-and-of-itself reflecting a carefully
considered policy choice. Instead, one must construe these phrases in the context of the sections and
clauses in which they appear, which is exactly what the Report does. Indeed, as discussed below, and
contrary to Professor Robertson's suggestion, the Report's analysis does not hinge on a claim that the
proper way to read OPA is to substitute the phrase "proximately caused by" for the phrase "due to" in
Section 2702(b)(2)(E). See infra text accompanying notes 18-37.
In a related argument, Professor Robertson maintains that the Report's reading of Section
2702(b)(2)(E)'s "due to" clause as limiting recovery for economic loss to interferences with use-rights is
defeated by the more explicit recognition of a use-right limitation in a nearby provision, namely Section
2702(b)(2)(C), which authorizes recovery for "loss of subsistence use of natural resources." Robertson,
supra note 4, at 183-84. There seems little basis for drawing this inference from this contrast. Indeed,
as noted in the Report and below, there is evidence that Congress understood these provisions to
parallel one another precisely by virtue of responding to interferences with use-rights. See GOilt,
supra note 2, at 34 (observing that this parallel is explicitly drawn in the 1990 Senate Report on OPA);
see also infra text accompanying note 42 (discussing the possible significance of the excision from prior
bills a threshold level of interference with use-rights).
18. 33 U.S.C. § 2702.
19. Robertson, supra note 4, at 168.
20. Id.
21. H.L.A. HARTI TONY Hoxotizi, CAU SATION IN illi LAW 68 (2d ed. 1985) (noting that "the
various causal notions employed for the purposes of explanation, attribution of responsibility, or the
assessment of contributions to the course of history carry with them implicit limits .. .")
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Report does not claim that the words "due to" in Section 2702(b)(2)(E)
must be interpreted to mean "proximately caused by." Rather, the Re-
port's claim is that OPA's test for economic loss liability, taken as a whole,
sets something akin to a proximate cause limitation on liability.
As noted in the Report, OPA could have been written so as to author-
ize recovery by any claimant for all economic losses resulting from a dis-
charge of oil. But, it was not. Instead, it authorizes recovery of damages
by any claimant for economic loss that "result[s] from" "a discharge of oil"
and that is "due to the injury, destruction, or loss of .. . property or natural
resources."9 22 Professor Robertson quietly concedes that the interpreter is
required to give some meaning to both requirements, 2 3 and the latter re-
quirement makes clear that economic loss, to be recoverable, must be
linked in some way to the occurrence of property or resource loss or
damage.
The Report entertains two possible renditions of this link. The first
posits that the connection is established as soon as an oil spill results in any
property or resource damage or loss-any at all. Once this first bit of dam-
age or loss happens, we are off to the races and anyone who can prove
having suffered economic loss because of the spill can recover. Such a
reading is untenable because it effectively reads the "due to" clause out of
the statute.2 4 The Report then maintains that it is vastly more plausible to
suppose that Congress meant the "due to" clause to authorize liability for
economic loss on terms that track, and perhaps extend beyond, the most
expansive versions of such liability found in admiralty law and state tort
law-namely, economic loss predicated on a loss of, or injury to, property
or resources that the claimant had a right to use, but neither owned nor
leased. 2 5 Again, this is not a claim about the meaning of the phrase "due
to." It is a claim about the meaning of OPA's two-layer causation
requirement.
Professor Robertson purports to identify a third reading of OPA's eco-
nomic loss provisions, one supposedly situated between the two just de-
scribed.2 6 On this reading, OPA would permit recovery for economic loss
for any instance in which property or resource damage or loss resulting
from a spill functions as a necessary condition for the occurrence of the
economic loss. To grasp this reading, we can consider how it applies to the
hypothetical oil spill discussed in the Report, in which a company ("Oil
Co.") is posited to be responsible for "a large discharge of oil in the Gulf
region" and is sued by sixteen imagined claimants.2 7 Professor Robertson's
22. 33 U.S.C. § 2702.
23. Robertson, supra note 4, at 197 n.198.
24. GOi)ii1 izc, supra note 2, at 19 ("[1]t would be exceedingly odd to suppose that Congress
meant to build the statute's liability provisions for economic loss around the theoretical but vanishingly
small probability of a spill that causes economic loss while causing no harm to, or loss of, property or
resources.").
25. Id. at 20.
26. Robertson, supra note 4, at 199-201.
27. GOLDBFRG, supra note 2, at 12-14.
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proffered reading of OPA invites the following inquiry with respect to each
claim. 2 8 Assume, counterfactually, that the Oil Co. spill did not generate
any loss or damage to property or natural resources. Now ask, would the
claimant in question still have suffered economic loss? If the answer to this
question is "no," then the economic loss is "due to" the property damage
or loss and is recoverable. If the answer is "yes," then the economic loss is
not "due to" the property loss or damage and is not recoverable.
For example, hypothesized claimant C, a commercial fisherman who is
idled by the Oil Co. spill, can readily satisfy this test. Had there been no
property and resource damage or loss, there would have been no loss of
fish. Because this damage or loss was necessary for the occurrence of C's
economic loss, C's lost profits were "due to" damage to, or loss of, property
or resources. By the same reasoning, W, a local shop owner who relies on
fishermen as customers will be able to recover. In contrast, Professor Rob-
ertson suggests that G, the owner of a franchised Oil Co. gas station in
Idaho who loses business because of a boycott prompted by the spill,
(probably) will not recover. 2 9 Although the spill itself served as a neces-
sary condition for G's economic losses-no spill, no boycott, no losses-the
damage to or loss of property and resources did not. (Even absent such
loss or damage, Professor Robertson says, the spill itself would have gener-
ated a boycott and attendant losses.)3 0 And L, the caterer who loses profits
because of budget cutbacks at Oil Co.'s New York headquarters, also
(probably) will not recover. According to Professor Robertson, it is likely
that Oil Co. would have cut back on its use of catering simply because of
the spill's freestanding "reputational effects."3 '
Professor Robertson's proposed alternative reading of OPA's eco-
nomic loss provisions is untenable. In fact, it turns out to be but a variant
on the interpretation already exposed as inadequate by the Report. Here
we must again pay close attention to OPA's language, and in particular
Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s reference to recovery for economic losses due to
the destruction or loss of property or natural resources. Keeping this last
sub-clause in mind, let us revisit the imagined claims of G and L. Under
Professor Robertson's reading of OPA, each can recover from Oil Co. if
each can show that profits would not have been lost had the spill caused no
destruction or loss of property and no destruction or loss of natural re-
sources. Professor Robertson supposes that neither G nor L will be able to
make this showing, but he is wrong about his own test. Again, it instructs
us to imagine, counterfactually, a spill causing no damage to, or loss of,
property or natural resources. What manner of spill is this? The answer, of
course, is a spill with a very modest impact, for only a very modest spill is
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one that will result in no loss of, and no damage to, natural resources in-
cluding clean water and animal and plant life onshore or offshore.3 2 And
yet a profoundly uneventful spill of this sort is just the sort of spill that is
highly unlikely to cause the sort of freestanding "reputational loss" that
would induce a boycott of a local gas station far removed from the scene of
the spill, or a cutback in Oil Co.'s use of catering services at its corporate
headquarters.3 3
Once we take seriously OPA's actual language and plug it into Profes-
sor Robertson's proposed framework, Section 2702(b)(2)(E)'s "due to"
clause collapses into Section 2702(a)'s "result from" clause. Insofar as G,
L, and perhaps any other claimant will be in a position to prove any eco-
nomic losses caused by a spill, they will be in a position to establish that
these losses were actually caused by damage to, or loss of, property or nat-
ural resources. Overwhelmingly-perhaps exclusively-the instances in
which there will be no liability for economic loss will be those instances in
which there is no economic loss at all. Conversely, a spill that does enough
damage to property or resources to cause any economic loss at all will be a
spill that generates liability for all such loss.3 4
The same point can be made by consideration of a different scenario.
Suppose that a discharge of oil from one of Oil Co.'s wells happens to de-
stroy particularly valuable property, and that, as a result, Congress and the
President enact onerous new regulations on drilling. (We can even suppose
that the legislation includes findings making clear that the property damage
is what spurred Congress to action.) As a result, other oil companies expe-
rience substantially lower profits from their drilling operations than they
would have earned in the absence of such regulations. On Professor Rob-
ertson's reading of OPA, these other companies ought to be able to recover
from Oil Co.;: 'its spill resulted in property damage without which their
32. As noted in the Report, "natural resources" is a defined term in OPA that includes 'land"
and "water" generically. GOiD1H1HRG, supra note 2, at 19.
33. It is vital to recognize that, under the terms of Professor Robertson's test, G and L should be
denied recovery only if their losses are attributable to reputational effects that operate independently of
property or resource loss or damage resulting from the spill. By contrast, if the occurrence of property
or resource damage or loss is necessary to bring about the reputational harm that in turn induces the
boycott or the reduction in Oil Co.'s demand for catering, then G's and L's losses would be "due to"
(i.e., actually caused by) the property or resource loss or damage, and hence recoverable under his
interpretation of OPA.
34. At a minimum, Professor Robertson's approach asks a great deal, and probably too much, of
the judicial system by inviting endless case-by-case speculations as to which economic losses might have
been incurred had a given spill not been accompanied by property or resource loss or damage. Because
he refuses to see principled limits in OPA's economic loss provisions, Professor Robertson can only
identify evidentiary grounds for denying economic loss claims. Thus, the most he can say about the
claims of G and L is that they "probably" will fail because G and L probably will not be able to prove
satisfactorily that they would have suffered economic loss had Oil Co.'s spill not resulted in loss of, or
damage to, property or resources. Robertson, supra note 4, at 173. Of course civil litigation routinely
requires factfinders to make counterfactual judgments about, say, whether a plaintiff's physical injury
would have occurred if a product had been designed differently, or a doctor had acted with greater care.
Still, there are serious process concerns with respect to theories of liability that consistently invite
highly speculative counterfactual inquiries. It counts against his reading of OPA that it would generate
a vast amount of litigation of this sort.
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losses would not have occurred. One might be inclined to think that Con-
gress's intervention-its decision to regulate-'breaks' the causal chain be-
tween the property damage, on the one hand, and the economic losses, on
the other. But to reason this way is to invoke a proximate-cause-like idea,
and Professor Robertson is adamant that OPA's economic loss provisions
have no place for any such idea.3
As Professor Robertson ultimately concedes,3 6 the Report's interpre-
tation of the text of OPA's economic loss provisions is entirely plausible.
His proposed alternative is not. To read the statute to require only an ac-
tual causal link between injury to property or resources, on the one hand,
and economic loss, on the other, is effectively to read Section
2702(b)(2)(E) out of the statute. It is also to attribute implausibly to Con-
gress a desire to extend economic loss liability to any person who can pro-
duce evidence suggesting a probable connection between an oil spill and
those losses, no matter how remote, indirect, or haphazard the connection
between the loss and the spill.
B. Legislative History, Case Law, and Policy Considerations
Although it relies primarily on OPA's text, the Report also consults
standard secondary materials, including legislative history, case law, and
possible policy considerations. Professor Robertson insists that the Report
is woefully deficient in its handling of each of these interpretive resources.
In keeping with the rest of his critique, these criticisms are stated in hyper-
bolic terms, yet consistently fall flat.
With respect to legislative history,37 Professor Robertson claims that
the Report ignores "general statements indicative of congressional intent
to authorize recovery of 'a broad class of damages.'" 38  It does not. In-
deed, the Report emphasizes that the Act was intended to provide com-
pensation for a wide range of injuries, including a wide range of economic
35. By contrast, the Report's interpretation, which treats OPA as incorporating proximate cause-
like limitations on liability for economic loss, allows for the possibility that such claims will be denied.
Indeed, it seems perfectly intuitive to distinguish for these purposes a denial of physical access to re-
sources or property that is part of an emergency response to a spill and a denial that results from
officials' forward-looking regulatory decisions.
36. Robertson, supra note 4, at 202.
37. It is worth observing at the outset of this discussion that OPA's legislative history is quite
extensive. OPA's enactment took place only after fifteen years of drafting and debate. The initial bill
was drafted separately in the Public Works and the Merchant Marine Committees in the House. These
committees resolved their differences by working with the Ways and Means Committee. Then, the Act
incorporated provisions from other proposed bills addressing Prince William Sound and the Trans-
Alaskan Pipeline. The Senate bill also went through many drafts and multiple committees. Then, the
Conference Committee resolved the differences between the two bills. The legislative history takes up
more than 150 pages in the Congressional Record. It should be no surprise that one can find, in this
history, stray statements pointing in various directions. The Report for its part attempted to rely only
on legislative history expressing relatively broad consensus on relatively specific matters, such as the
desire to enable commercial fishermen to recover for losses due to their inability to fish because of a
spill.
38. Robertson, supra note 4, at 174 n.58.
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loss claims unrelated to any injury to one's person or property. Nothing in
the Report is inconsistent with this general language.
Robertson also argues the Report is flawed because it would deny re-
covery to chandlers-those whose business is to supply bait, tackle, and
maintenance services to vessels-even though OPA's legislative history
suggests that Congress "pretty clearly wanted to include [them]."" Let us
grant for purposes of argument that chandlers would be precluded from
recovery under the Report's reading of OPA.4 0 The only directly relevant
evidence of Congressional intent with respect to chandlers offered by Pro-
fessor Robertson is a single statement by Representative Schneider that
"bait and tackle store owners" stand to recover for economic loss under
OPA.4 1 Representative Schneider's statement did not arise during debates
on OPA but rather occurred months after the House passed its bill-it was
added to the congressional record after the fact. At most, this is evidence
of how one representative interpreted the pre-conference bill. There is no
evidence that any other member of Congress agreed with this interpreta-
tion, nor any evidence that anyone even knew that this was Schneider's
interpretation before they voted on the bill.42 The existence of a stray bit
of legislative history possibly pointing in a different direction than an inter-
pretation that is overwhelmingly supported by a statute's text cannot count
against that interpretation. No reading of OPA's text can hope to be en-
tirely consistent with every statement that can be found in its sprawling
history. 4 3
According to Professor Robertson, the Report's emphasis on interfer-
ence with use-rights as a condition for recovery for economic loss is also
undermined by the fact that early versions of OPA included language that,
more so than Section 2702(b)(2)(E), explicitly tied recovery for economic
loss to interferences with such rights. For example, in a 1989 House Bill,
the relevant provision would have allowed recovery for:
39. Id. at 175.
40. In fact, chandlers would seem to fall into the gray area occupied by hypothesized claimants
R, A, and W. GOLDBERG, supra note 2, at 41. The suggestion in the Report is that these claimants
cannot prevail if OPA's economic loss provisions are strictly applied, but could conceivably recover if a
court were to read those provisions in a manner that placed very great weight on the apparent aspira-
tion behind OPA to respond to the economic dislocation suffered by businesses in those localities most
directly affected by oil spills. Whether general statements of legislative purpose are enough to support
a marginal expansion of liability is in part a question of how best to undertake statutory construction.
41. Robertson, supra note 4, at 174 n.58.
42. Cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979) ("The remarks of a single legislator,
even the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history."); In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 912 n.3
(9th Cir. 1988) ("Stray comments by individual legislators, not otherwise supported by statutory lan-
guage or committee reports, cannot be attributed to the full body that voted on the bill.").
43. Nor does it count against the Report's interpretation that one can find a few general state-
ments from individual legislators to the effect that OPA would enable all persons injured by an oil spill
to recuver daimages fromi a respuuisible party. See Rubertsuon, supra iiute 4, at 174 ni.58 (quoting state-
ments of this sort). Not even Professor Robertson supposes that OPA's damages provisions can be
stretched to enable recovery by a resident of Maine who suffers serious emotional distress after viewing
images of the spill on his or her computer.
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Damages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earn-
ing capacity ... due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real
property, personal property, or natural resources[,] . . .
[which] shall be recoverable by any claimant who derives at
least 25 percent of his or her earnings from the activities
which utilize such property or natural resources, or, if such
activities are seasonal in nature, 25 percent of his or her
earnings during the applicable season.44
Of course Congress eventually enacted only the italicized portion of
this draft provision. Robertson concedes that "no explanation has been
found" for this change. 45 Nonetheless, he boldly infers that it stands for the
wholesale rejection of any use-right limitation on liability for economic
loss. In fact, the deletion as readily or more readily supports the Report's
interpretation, for it suggests that legislators all along had use-rights in
mind, but simply decided against setting a threshold damage requirement
for claims of interference with such rights.
Robertson also points to a passage in the House Conference Report
on OPA which states as follows: "Subsection (b)(2)(E) provides that any
claimant may recover for loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity
resulting from [the statutory term is "due to"] injury to property or natural
resources." 4 6 This passage, he maintains, provides an "authoritative state-
ment by Congress that "'resulting from'" and "'due to'" are synonyms." 47
His belief that this passage counts against the analysis of OPA provided in
the Report to the GCCF trades on the misunderstanding already discussed
above. To reiterate: The Report's analysis does not rest on a claim about
the meaning of the words "due to," taken in isolation. It instead rests on
the double-layered causation requirement established by the interaction of
Sections 2702(a) and 2702(b)(2)(E). Nothing in this bit of legislative his-
tory suggests that the "due to" clause of Section 2702(b)(2)(E) is to be
understood as redundant with Section 2702(a)'s "result from" clause. Quite
the opposite, the statement takes for granted the separateness of the "due
to" requirement even as it suggests that the phrases "resulting from" and
"due to" do not carry dramatically different meanings.
Turning now from legislative history to case law, it is worth noting that
the Report to the GCCF invokes judicial decisions predominantly in sup-
port of three propositions. First, it cites federal and state decisions to es-
tablish the admiralty and state-tort-law backdrop to OPA, and in particular
the widely adopted rule that pure economic loss is not recoverable. Profes-
sor Robertson claims that the Report massively understates the extent to
which certain decisions, such as the New Jersey Supreme Court's People
44. H.R. 3027, 101st Cong. § 102(a)(2)(B)(v) (1st Sess. 1989) (emphasis added).
45. Robertson, supra note 4, at 185.
46. Jd. at 188.
47. Id.
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Express decision,4 8 have cut back on the pure economic loss rule. The
sources cited in the Report indicate otherwise. 4 9
Second, the Report discusses some federal court decisions interpreting
two of OPA's statutory forbearers: CERCLA and TAPAA. These deci-
sions are cited for a proposition that is modest but important-namely, that
courts examining closely analogous statutory provisions have read some-
thing akin to proximate cause limitations into even unadorned causation
requirements, which in turn strengthens the case for reading OPA's double-
layered causation requirement as specifying a comparable set of limita-
tions. For example, TAPAA states simply that a party responsible for oil
released from certain kinds of vessels is subject to strict liability for "all
damages . . . sustained by any person. . . as the result of discharge[ ] of oil
from such vessel,"5 0 yet the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Benefiel
decision interpreted this open-ended language to contain an implicit proxi-
mate-cause-like limitation.i
One would have thought that Professor Robertson would forthrightly
criticize Benefiel for reading liability limitations into TAPAA, but he does
not.5 2 Rather, he seems to endorse Benefiel's dismissal of claims alleging
that the Exxon Valdez oil spill had caused consumers economic loss in the
form of higher gasoline prices.53 It is difficult to see how Professor Robert-
son can embrace the Ninth Circuit's rejection of these claims as "ridicu-
lous," yet then turn around and criticize the Report's analysis of OPA.5 4
Perhaps he takes the view that Benefiel was rightly decided because the
plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence of an actual causal connection be-
tween the Valdez spill and higher gas prices. But, this is an untenable read-
ing of the decision. Benefiel affirmed the grant of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim." The plaintiffs had no opportunity to prove causa-
tion, and the Ninth Circuit did not rely and could not have relied on the
absence of proof of actual causation as a ground for its decision>" Instead,
48. People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 118 (N.J. 1985).
49. See GOiDmuERG, supra note 2, at 26-30 nn.57-71. To take but one example, the Report cites
an article by Professor Robert Rabin, a judicious scholar who is hardly ill-disposed toward relaxation of
traditional limited duty and proximate cause limitations, stating that People Express "stands as a lonely
outpost." Id. at 30, n.69.
50. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (2011).
51. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1992).
52. Professor Robertson half-heartedly invokes against Benefiel dictum from the Glacier Bay
decision issued by the federal district of Alaska, which declined to read any form of proximate cause
limitations into TAPAA. Robertson, supra note 4, at 178 (citing In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379,
1386 (D. Alaska 1990)). But, this dictum was subsequently contradicted and therefore rejected in
Benefiel, which was decided by the Court of Appeals that sits in review of the decisions of the Alaska
district court. The fact that a legal database has chosen not to characterize Benefiel as having overruled
Glacier Bay is of no moment. A lawyer appearing in court within the Ninth Circuit could not properly
cite Glacier Bay for the proposition that TAPAA contains no proximate cause limitations.
53. Id.
54. Id. The term "ridiculous" is Professor Robertson's, not the court's.
55b. Benefiel, 959 F.2d at 808.
56. Jd. at 807-08 (affirming dismissal on the ground that, under the theory of liability articulated
in the plaintiffs' complaint, the spill could not count as a proximate or legal cause of plaintiffs' alleged
losses).
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Professor Robertson's acceptance of Benefiel can only rest on a recognition
that the court was right to interpret TAPAA to contain proximate cause-
like limitations on liability." And if it is proper to read such limitations
into TAPAA-which requires on its face only that the loss in question be
"the result of" a discharge of oil from a vessel-then surely it is proper to
interpret OPA's facially narrower, two-layered causation requirement to
set limits on liability for economic loss beyond proof of actual causation."
Third, the Report very briefly reviews what it acknowledges to be a
sparse set of cases applying OPA's damages provisions. Professor Robert-
son erroneously implies that the Report relies heavily on the Fifth Circuit's
decision in In re Taira Lynn Marine Ltd.," and then he criticizes the Re-
port because that decision "does not seem particularly instructive" on" the
issue of economic loss.6 0 This is an argumentative shell-game. Taira Lynn
is indeed not particularly instructive in this context, which is precisely why
the Report places little reliance on it. It is first cited as one among several
cases in a "see also" string-citation.6 1 It is then mentioned in passing as
arguably having adopted a view of OPA liability that is in some ways less
generous to economic loss claimants than the view adopted in the Report.6 2
Finally, turning to policy considerations, Professor Robertson critiques
the Report on two grounds. First, he asserts that the Report's interpreta-
tion of OPA runs afoul of the fact that "the OPA Congress intended to rip
the Robins/Testbank rule out of the law of OPA cases, root and branch." 6 3
This argument is question-begging. Of course Congress abolished as a re-
quirement for economic loss claims proof that the loss was parasitic on
damage to the claimant's property. The question remains: What liability
regime did Congress put in its place? Professor Robertson seems to sup-
pose that OPA's elimination of the categorical bar to recovery for pure
economic loss found in admiralty and tort law entails the elimination of any
limitations on liability for economic loss. This is a non-sequitur. That one
may recover for economic loss caused by an oil spill even absent damage to
one's property does not entail that one is always entitled to recover for such
loss and in fact the relevant statutory language rejects any such entailment.
Professor Robertson also criticizes the Report's approach for offering
an account of the statute that draws an unmotivated and unprincipled line
between those who can recover under OPA for economic loss and those
who cannot. And yet, the recognition of claims based on interferences with
57. Robertson, supra note 4, at 178-79.
58. At this juncture in his analysis, Professor Robertson appears to rely entirely on legislative
history, arguing that OPA's legislative history warrants reading OPA more broadly than TAPAA not-
withstanding that OPA's plain language with respect to liability for economic loss is narrower than
TAPAA's. Id. Whatever the best reading of OPA's legislative history, see supra text accompanying
notes 37-47, it cannot support an interpretation that ignores OPA's text.
59. 444 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2006).
60. Robertson, supra note 4, at 191.
61. GOLDBFRG, supra note 2, at 26 n.58.
62. Id. at 34-35, 40.
63. Robertson, supra note 4, at 180.
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use-rights is hardly odd or exotic. Ever since the common law first recog-
nized actions for nuisance, it has identified use-rights in property as a class
of rights worthy of protection apart from the rights not to have one's prop-
erty physically damaged or physically invaded by the wrongful conduct of
another. In any event, as indicated in the Report, the question is not
whether OPA is optimally designed to realize certain goals or principles.
The question is whether the lines generated by an otherwise compelling
interpretation of the statute are so irrational as to call that interpretation
into question. As the Report explains, its interpretation of OPA identifies
lines that are not only intelligible but entirely reasonable. 64
III. CONCLUSION
The Deepwater Horizon Spill was a cataclysmic event that has had,
and presumably will continue to have, dramatic physical and economic con-
sequences for the Gulf States and beyond. OPA was enacted by Congress
to deal with this kind of event. However, the statute does so on certain
terms, and those are the terms that courts adjudicating claims brought
under it are bound to honor. Conceivably, Congress could have enacted a
statute that allows anyone who can demonstrate economic loss resulting
from an oil spill to recover from a party responsible for the spill. OPA is
not that statute. It allows recovery only by those whose economic losses
are due to damage or loss of property or resources resulting from a spill.
The best reading of this statutory language entails recovery for those who,
because of a spill, suffer an interference with their rights to use particular
property or resources for commercial purposes.
64. GOiDiiHRG, supra note 2, at 36-38.
216 [VOL. 30:203
